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Abstract 
This paper attempts to explain the divergence of paths in the field of industrial relations between Australia and New 
Zealand under Labour in the eighties. Key themes in the paper concern stale autonomy, the relationship between the 
union movement and the Labour party in each country, and the different strategic contexts within which policies were 
formulated and pursued. This paper has its origins in a joint project undertaken by Mark Brayl and myself, which will 
eventually come out as a chapter of a book comparing Australia and New Zealand under Labour governments in the 
eighliesl. The chapter aJtempts to explain why there has been increasing divergence between Australian and New 
Zealand industrial relations regimes in the eighties and nineties. This paper takes up some themes of divergence and 
convergence which arose while working on the chapter but could not be developed in that forum. 
While comparative studies have become an increasingly 
important area of academic study, those contrasting Aus-
ttalia and New Zealand are relatively sparse (Castles 1985; 
Brosnan, Burgess and R~ 1992; Bray and Haworth, 
1993.) Comparative work that has been done in industrial 
relations has tended to emphasise similarities between the 
countries, talking of an Australasian model, at least up 
until eighties (Brosnan, Burgess and Rea, 1992.). The 
Brosnan et al paper, and the Bray and Haworth book, do 
provide useful comparative analyses of the experience of 
the eighties, and both identify areas of difference. Overall, 
though, there has been little attempt to explain the diver-
gence tendency between the two countries in recent dec-
ades. 
Until the 1980s, there would seem to be good grounds for 
maintaining the similarity argument But a similarity 
argument is slightly different from a convergence argu-
ment Convergence implies that similarity is increasing; 
while divergence implies that similarity is decreasing (or 
difference is increasing). The literature has not taken up 
the more dynamic question of convergence and diver-
gence. 
This emphasis on similarity is in keeping with the other 
noticeable trend in New Zealand Industrial Relations dis-
course: which has been to emphasise continuity and to see 
change primarily as incremental within the context of an 
established and unchanging set of foundation principles. 
Within that mindset, given their common Industrial Rela-
tions heritage, the differences between New Zea1and and 
Australian experiences have tended not to be emphasised. 
The introduction of the Employment Contracts Act has 
undermined that tendency. But it would be a mistake to see 
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continuity and similarity between the two regimes as 
something which characterised experience up until this 
recent legislative change. An awroach that emphasises 
similarity and continuity might fail to appreciate that 
divergence between Australia and New Zealand Industrial 
Relations systems began much earlier, and one needs to 
look back much further so that the Employment Contracts 
Act can be seen in the context of a steady divergence 
between Australia and New Zealand, which has its roots 
from at least the early seventies. 
Since the introduction of the Employment Contracts Act, 
divergence between Industrial Relations contexts in Aus-
tralia and New Zealand has become much sharper. How-
ever, the impulse has been to show how the greater 
continuity of direction in Industrial Relations in Australia 
has produced more desirable economic and social out-
comes (Brosnan, Burgess and Rea, 1992). The social 
democratic agenda appears to be that New Zealand's 
departure from a centralised and state regulated form of 
industrial relations is the cause of less desirable economic 
and social outcomes. 
This paper comprises a brief discussion of some central 
theoretical issues of comparison and then offers a short 
explanation of diverging trends in Australia and New 
Zealand. 
Studying national differences 
Reasons why the observer may want to emphasise differ-
ence or similarity when comparing national experiences is 
itself a tricky question, and there are many agendas. For 
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example, a structural Marxist tends to exaggerate the 
extent of national convergence because s/he wants to be 
able to highlight the explanatory power of certain key 
structural variables which are common to all capitalists 
countries. A Thompsonian historian, on the other hand, 
emphasises difference because, after all, people make their 
own history in cultmally unique environments. Similarly, 
a social democrat emphasises state autonomy because this 
is in keeping with social democratic ideology; while Marx-
ists emphasise long term economic determination of out-
comes in keeping with Marxist ideology. Explaining 
convergence and divergence between Australia and New 
Zealand Industrial Relations regimes centrally relates to 
these themes. In this paper, I examine the extent to which 
state autonomy and particular conjunctural3 variations 
between countries might explain convergence and diver-
gence. 
State autonomy refers mainly to the extent to which the 
state is able to pursue its own agenda free from the 
pressures of key interest groups in society. "States con-
ceived as organisations claiming control over territories 
and people may fonnulate and plU'Sue goals that are not 
simply reflective of the demands or interests of social 
groups, classes or society" (Skocpol,1985: 9). State au-
tonomy theorists do not propose a general theory of state 
autonomy, but seek to explain levels of state autonomy 
within the context of "historical studies that are sensitive 
to structural variations and conjunctural changes within 
given polities" (ibid). State autonomy is therefore also 
about the choices open to a govemmen~ and choices will 
be centrally related to the social configuration of interest 
groups and their relative powers, but also related to eco-
nomic viability. 
In sho~ 'state autonomy' is not a fued structural 
feature of any governmental system. It can come and go. 
This is true not only because crises may precipitate the 
fonnulation of official strategies and policies by elites or 
administrators who otherwise might not mobilise their 
own potentials for state action. It is also true because the 
very structural potentials for autonomous state actions 
change over time, as the organisations of coercion and 
administrntion undergo transformations, both intemall y 
and in their relation to societal groups and to representa-
tive parts of government (Skocpol, 1985: 140). 
Skocpol's position lends itself to further claims. Certain 
conjunctural similarities, especially those which result in 
high levels of institutional, legislative, and normic similar-
ity, increase the likelihood of convergence between two 
countries. Similar modes of regulation imply the likeli-
hood of similar patterns of reproduction over time, imply-
ing convergence. Continuing convergence in this environ-
ment is due to a low level of state autonomy. The 
opportunity for radical structmal change to a regime is 
unlikely to arise, in other words, there is limited 'potential 
for autonomous state action, when a mode of regulation is 
operating within a context of balanced growth. We only 
try to fix things, i.e., change things, when they are breaking 
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down. Insofar as balanced growth depends on the fit 
between a national mode of regulation and the interna-
tional economic framew~ then changes to the external 
economic environment influence 'structural potentials for 
state action'. 
Divergence would seem to be a more likely outcome when 
the opportunity for state autonomy is highest That is, 
when the state has more choices divergent outcomes are 
more likely. The opportunity for state autonomy increases 
when an existing ' mode of regulation' is in crisis. A crisis 
of a mode of regulation implies the nee<L and growing 
economic and social pressure from interest groups and 
voters, to change, and there are always different potential 
paths for change. However, economic imperatives and the 
state' s relation to different interest groups always con-
strain the choices available to any set of political actors. 
Choices may in fact be more constrained if an economic 
crisis is very deep. For example, in both New Zealand and 
Australia in the late seventies there was a growing realisa-
tion of the need to restructure the political economy. In 
other words, the choice of continuing with the given mode 
of regulation was increasingly not a choice. The choice 
was more about which path of restructuring to pursue. In 
some cases of external economic dependence, choices 
about the path of restructuring may also be very limited. 
However, state actors may be able to ignore such pressures 
and constraints, for a time, contributing to conjunctural 
variations between countries and subsequently different 
outcomes. For example, Prime Minister Muldoon man-
aged to continue down the path of the status quo regardless 
of the economic imperatives. It is probably the case that the 
wilfulness of this individual politician is important for 
explaining the greater divergence of subsequent develop-
ments between Australia and New Zealand_ That is, the 
need for economic restructuring in New Zealand in 1984 
was more pressing and would require more drastic meas-
ures than in Australia, because of Muldoon' s entrenched 
conservatism. More generally, though, Australia's com-
parative advantage in tenns of natural mineral resources 
and a bigger market probably meant a less severe eco-
nomic decline than New Zea1and anyway. Certainly, 
Australia had maintained a higher OECD rating than New 
Zealand- The point here is that the deg~ee of decline and 
the size of the crisis influence which choice political actors 
make in a time of economic decline and impending crisis. 
This line of argument does not appeal to social democrats 
since they want to be able to argue that Australia is a more 
economically viable society because it didn ' t follow the 
New Right path of economic restructuring. I would rather 
argue it the other way around. That is, New Zealand's 
worse economic situation and its comparative disadvan-
tage may partly explain the greater divergence in subse-
quent industrial relations policy outcomes. A defensible 
thesis is that the greater the economic crisis, then the 
greater the likelihood of a departure from the established 
mode of regulation or institutional and policy frameworks. 
That is, New Zealand moved further than Australia in the 
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opposite direction of the old regime because in New 
Zealand tbe old regime appeared to be more of a loser and 
therefore required a more radical remedy .4 Choices made 
by governments are likely to be influenced by the extent 
and seriousness of economic decline. However, voter 
preferences, which determine which political party be-
comes government in tbe first place, also influence politi-
cal outcomes. 
Perhaps I am overstating the economic divergence argu-
ment for explaining different state actions? Explaining 
divergence as a result of relative differences in the inten-
sity of economic decline and crisis is essentially a func-
tionalist explanation that does not identify the actual 
political processes that more directly account for the 
differing directions of policy change. We might therefore 
ask a slightly different question: given a similar economic 
imperative, why did each country respond differently? 
Even more )YOCisely, if one accepts that the central choice 
for Australia and New Zealand, in the face of serious 
structural economic difficulty. was between a corporatist-
strategic resb ucturing and a more direct and radical free 
market restructuring, then the explanation devolves on to 
the respective forces in each country that would tend to 
push in one or other of these two principle directions. 
Differing economic environments only provide a potential 
motivating purpose for understanding why New Zealand 
moved more radically down the free market road than 
Aus~ but this type of explanation does not identify 
specific political forces and struggles that differentially 
define and explain the process itself. And this brings us 
back to the state autonomy argument 
State autonomy theorists have tended to emphasise the 
extent to which the state can impose its policy agenda 
regardless of vested capitalist interests (Poulantzas, 1980; 
Skocpol, 1985). The other side of state autonomy, which 
links in much more closely with the New Right agenda for 
a minimal state, is where the state divests itself of insti-
tutional obligations to the welfare state and organised 
labour (Schwartz, 1994). Regarding organised labour, 
governments pursue institutional reorganisation that places 
the industrial relations framework more directly in the 
hands of the protagonists themselves, and thereby dis-
tances itself from outcomes; i.e. achieves more autonomy. 
A weakening of the bargaining power of unions further 
enhances this autonomy. The ability of government to 
pursue such a policy direction depends on the extent to 
which the government is autonomous from organised 
labour. The ability of the state to pursue the distancing 
exercise may depend on such factors as the extent of prior 
commitment to organised labour and the extent of trust 
between government and the union movement 
However. while this greater autonomy of the state from 
organisM labour and employers seems to imply greater 
overall state autonomy, this could be misleading. Institu-
tionally both employers and organised labour are dis-
tanced from the state. However, such distancing is bowing 
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to the pressures and interests of capital when organised 
labour is weak. That is, greater autonomy from interfering 
state regulation is in the interests of employers. In turn, the 
state is compelled to follow the interests of capital, at least 
the interests of capital conceived collectively, in a time of 
crisis restructuring because economic viability depends 
ultimately on capitalist viability that is being threatened. 
Explaining convergence and divergence between Aus-
tralia and New Zealand in the field of industrial relations 
raises a range of tricky questions. The establishment of 
similar modes of regulation combined with stable growth 
would strongly indicate convergence, or at least high 
similarity with only weak divergence over time. Opportu-
nities for political actors to make different political choices 
would seem to be central for explaining the likelihood of 
divergence. However, opportunities for state autonomy 
depend not only on the breakdown (and type and extent of 
breakdown) of a 'regime of accumulation'; but also on the 
relation of political actors to key interest groups, and 
therefore to the dynamics of the interest groups them-
selves. Moreover, the role of particular individuals and the 
timing of particular political and policy changes within 
parties and governments, and within and between key 
interest groups in society 'overdetermines • the con junctura! 
dynamic of a social formation. The con junctura! dynamic 
of a society provides that unique and specific dimension to 
any explanation of national convergence or divergence. 
Convergence and divergence: The Australa-
• • saan experaence 
A comparison of Australian and New Zealand Industrial 
Relations experiences might try to explain, first, why there 
have been relatively high levels of similarity (and a degree 
of convergence) between Australia and New Zealand until 
the seventies, an<L second, why after such a long period of 
relative similarity, the Industrial Relations regimes of each 
country have begun to diverge noticeably in the eighties 
and nineties. 
The establishment of very similar conciliation and arbitra-
tion systems in both countries at around the same time late 
last century (New Zealand) and early this century (Aus-
tralia) is obviously central for explaining consequent in-
dustrial relations similarity between the two countries. 
The common British heritage, the role of Wil1iam Pember 
Reeves in drafting both sets of legislation, geographical 
proximity, the shared experience of the 1890 Maritime 
strike, and relative similarity in the social culture of the two 
popnlations are obvious factors for explaining the similar-
ity of industrial relations frameworks. In short, the estab-
lishment of a similar legislative framew~ combined 
with other cultural and historical similarities, help to 
explain subsequent similarity of industrial relations re-
gimes. The shared philosophy of the first Labour govern-
ments of Australia and New Zealand fostered continuing 
similarity. And the general convergence of experience 
related to the boom of the fifties and sixties, and within 
this, the broad acceptance of welfare principles, relativity 
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bargaining and Keynesianisrn, belps to explain similarity 
until the seventies. 
Similar early legislatio~ first Labour government re-
forms, and international convergence of economic regula-
tion in the post war period all tended to have the effect of 
narrowing differences and enhancing the similarity of the 
two regimes. However. dwing periods of similarity and 
convergence, subtle differences that would lead to future 
divergence were also emerging. One key difference has 
been the different political systems. The unicameral 
parliamentary system of New Zealand has made it much 
easier to implement radical change, while the Australian 
federal system has tended to moderate that ability. Cer-
tainly this difference is relevant at least to the experience 
of the eighties, making it much easier for a New Zealand 
government to implement radical change. 
The labour movements of each country have a nwnber of 
similarities; but differences, which had been developing 
from an earlier period, were becoming more obvious by 
the seventies. I emphasise two differences here: 
* the continuation of more stable and enduring links 
between party and union in Australia than in New Zea-
land. 
* the earlier movement of the Australian union movement 
beyond 'labourism • towards a more strategic-corporatist 
perspective. 
These differences in the relationship between political 
actor (party that became government) and interest group 
(unions) influenced the ability of the state to pursue au-
tonomous action. However, the experience of the seven-
ties -differing levels of economic decline, different politi-
cal responses to economic decline in the seventies, and 
differing legislative modifications, and resulting experi-
ences, of the industrial relations regimes - magnified the 
significance of these differences. 
The key points that are relevant to explaining divergent 
outcomes after the election of the respective Labour gov-
ernments of Australia and New Zealand in 1983 and 1984 
are directly to do with state autonomy and conjunctural 
differences in the seventies, and then, subsequently, were 
related to the consequences of differing economic strate--
gies of Labour governments once in power. 
The New Zealand Labour Government could move (tenta-
tively) in the direction of decentralisation of industrial 
relations and labour market de-regulation because it was 
relatively autonomous from the union movement, since 
there was no framework agreed on before the election, and 
because there were relatively high levels of trust on the 
side of the union movement Once in power it pursued 
policies that led to increased unemployment which under-
mined union bargaining power, and began the process of 
removing itself from responsibility for specific industrial 
relations outcomes through the Labour Relations Act The 
increasing influence of Big Business, and the New Right 
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disposition of Treasury encouraged the government to 
move further in this dhectioo. The increasing unity and 
influence of employer-business interests, especially the 
Business Round Table and the Employers Federation, 
have meant that while the state achieved increasing au-
tonomy from labour, it came more and more under the 
influence of the employers· agenda. 
In comparative contrast, the Australian Labom Govern-
ment (ALG) pursued a cotporatist direction, the Accord, 
which it had negotiated with the Australian Council of 
Trade Unions, and was thereby committed to this course of 
action. The Accord framework, placed the government at 
the centre of the industrial relations framework. 1bis 
framework constrained the ability of the government to 
distance itself from industrial relations outcomes, and 
more specifically, from the demands of organised labour. 
However. a trusting union leadership and rising unem-
ployment towards the end of the eighties has made it easier 
for the ALG also to pursue steady decentralisation. Al-
though Australian employers were relatively disunited 
through the eighties, which made the Accord easier to put 
in practice (state autonomy from capital), they have been 
able to put increasing pressure on government to move 
towards a more decentralised framework. 
Explaining diverging levels of state autonomy centrally 
concerns why the wings of the labour movement in Aus-
tralia were able to construct an agreed framework, and why 
this did not occur in New Zealand. The greater unity and 
co-operation of the labour movement in Australia made an 
agreed corporatist plan more feasible and likely to occur. 
In New ZeaJand, the relatively late movement of the New 
Zealand union movement to adopt a clearly corporatist 
agenda and to develop the organisational conditions con-
ducive to corporatism. combined with a lack of close 
constructive relations between party and unio~ under-
mined the possibility of a common agreement before 
Labom took power. 
Differing 'conjunctural' dynamics also influenced the 
divergence in policy directions of the respective labom 
movements. Similar policy directions, but which occur 
within different time frames, often imply differing strate-
gic contexts, and therefore can result in very different 
policy struggles and outcomes. Three examples follow: 
First, the earlier attachment of conservatives to a monetar-
ist direction in Australia. or at least the perception of this 
direction by the Labour Party and the union movement, 
combined with a relatively positive experience of central-
ised wage fixing, framed the appositional response of the 
labour movement away from monetarism towards corpo-
ratism. The late movement of conservatives in New 
Zealand towards the free market (not till the mid eighties), 
and the negative experience of the state-led wage fixing 
system under Muldoon, pushed the New Zealand union 
movement in the opposite direction towards the principle 
of 'free collective bargaining •, and the Labour Party t<r 
wards the free market 







Second, while the Employers Fedezation in New Zealand 
was open to some elements of a corporatist framework by 
the early eighties, and was relatively united, neither the 
union movement nor the Labour Party was ready f<r such 
a path. By the time they were starting to reach this point 
by the late eighties, the employers' agenda had moved 
more emphatically to a New Right position. In Australia, 
the relative dismrity of employers meant they had little 
influence over the direction of industrial relations. They 
were unlikely to be able to stand in the way of a bi-partite 
c<rparatism between the Labour Party and the ACfU, but 
their disunity undennined the possibility of a full tri-partite 
caporatism. It might be the case that the m <re aggressive 
free marlcet approach of New Zealand put more pressure 
on capital, than the looser fiscal policy of Australia. As a 
result, we might expect that New Zealand capital would 
put m<R pressure on the government to introduce labour 
market flexibility, than in Australia 
~ the pursuit of a corporatist agenda by the NZcru 
once Labour took power in New ZeaJand implied a radi-
cally different strategic terrain, than the pursuit of such an 
agenda in Australia before Labour took power. The 
adoption of a c<XpOratist framework under a reasonably 
unified union leadership in the late seventies enabled the 
construction of the Accord and was fundamental to setting 
the direction of policy under the Ha wire government. The 
adoption by the NZCI1J of such an outlook in the second 
half of the eighties served to reinforce the ability of 
government to ignore the corporatist plan while the 
Rogemomics agenda was firmly in place. 
The difference between a government with high levels of 
state autonomy, seeking, once in power, to enhance its 
autonomy over labour still fmther, and a government that 
had agreed to work with the union movement is central for 
explaining divergent industrial relations outcomes be-
tween Australia and New Zealand in the eighties. Here is 
the basic explanation for the growing divergence in indus-
trial relations directions during the eighties and nineties. 
Back to convergence? 
The divergence of the eighties, however, should not blind 
us to a counter -tendency that has been gathering force until 
the present. That is, there are other arguments that might 
suggest that Australia is moving more clearly towards the 
flexible labour market of New Zealand. That is, Australia 
is being forced down such a road as economic factors 
become more pressing. Within the present economic 
environment, countries are compelled to pursue an ·export 
regulation' model and to seek international competitive-
ness. 5 As the viability of capital depends more and more 
on such international competitiveness, capital is likely to 
push for greater labour market flexibility. 
Whether New ZeaJand moves away slightly from its present 
direction towards more intervention and concertation is 
perhaps less easy to judge. It depends largely on who gets 
into government Nonetheless, if New Zealand's eco-
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nomic growth continues, and brings with it increasing 
employment and increasing expectations; then the govern-
ment (whatever political hue) may well be forced to move 
in a more corporatist direction. 
Conclusion 
This paper has presented a state-centred analysis of rea-
sons for convergence and divergence between the differ-
ent national regimes of Australia and New Zea.lan<L with 
particular emphasis on industrial relations. It has focused 
as a basis for explanation on the factors that open up the 
possibility for autonomous state action; and factors that 
constrain such autonomy. 
Convergence has been encourage<L firs~ by the extent to 
which international or global economic factors have forced 
governments down a particular path (such as the experi-
ence of the post-war boom, or the pressure to be 'export-
competitive' in the nineties). Secon<L as long as Austral-
ia's and New Zealand's similar modes of economic regu-
lation delivered stability and growth then similarity is 
likely to continue. In turn, a range of historical, geographi-
cal, political. cultural factors of similarity between Aus-
tralia and New Zealand at the turn of the century loosely 
detennined the establishment of similar modes of indus-
trial regulation. 
Divergence between the two countries was encouraged 
when the breakdown of the international economic pattern 
and the related breakdown of an internal mode of eco-
nomic regulation opened up a greater range of opportuni-
ties for autonomous state action. However, different 
responses by political actors in each country in the seven-
ties, Muldoon's conservatism versus Fraser's 'monetar-
ism', set up different strategic terrains and encouraged 
different viewpoints for political actors in the eighties. For 
example, the subsequently worse economic situation of 
New Zealand in the eighties, which was probably related 
also to comparative disadvantage with Australia. encour-
aged a belief in the need for radical change. Which 
direction a government pursues, in the situation of greater 
opportunity for autonomous state action, also crucially 
depends on the relation of governments and parties to 
interest groups. In this case study, how far and how 
quickly state action at odds with the wlions' perspectives 
could be pursued depended on the differing stability and 
closeness of relations between the wings of the respective 
labour movements. 
Future research 
This paper has only introduced briefly some thoughts 
about comparative explanation, and about comparing 
Australia and New Zealand industrial relations experi-
ences. Future research could develop these themes in a 
number of ways. The underlying questions: 'why differ-
ence?' and 'why similarity?' need fmther consideration. 
It is one thing to describe difference and similarity, another 
thing altogether to explain them. It is an old theme but one 
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that is crying out f<r further re-examination in the nineties. 
There are at least four elements to the analysis: economic 
factors, relationship of government to the political system, 
interest groups, and to voters, coojunctural factors, and the 
effects of particular individuals. These different elements 
that explain similarity and difference, the relationship 
between the elements, and their relative importance needs 
to be developed within a more historical and empirical 
context. 1bis case study requires a more detailed com-
parative examination of the whole historical development 
of Australia and New Zealand. 
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